FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN WARTIME
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War and preparation for war create serious strains on a system
of freedom of expression. Emotions run high, lowering the degree
of rationality which is required to make such a system viable. It
becomes more difficult to hold the rough give-and-take of controlled
controversy within constructive bounds. Immediate events assume
greater importance; long-range considerations are pushed to the background. The need for consensus appears more urgent in the context
of dealing with hostile outsiders. Cleavage seems to be more dangerous, and dissent more difficult to distinguish from actual aid to
the enemy. In this volatile area the constitutional guarantee of free
and open discussion is put to its most severe test.
It is not surprising, therefore, that throughout our history periods
of war tension have been marked by serious infringements on freedom
of expression. The most violent attacks upon the right to free speech
occurred in the years of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the approach to
the Civil War, the Civil War itself, and World War I-all times of
war or near-war.1 Yet it was not until the end of World War I that
judicial application of the first amendment played any significant role
in these events. Up to this point there had been no major decision by
the Supreme Court applying the guarantees of the first amendment.
Then, in 1919, the Court issued the first of a series of decisions dealing
with federal and state legislation that had been enacted to restrict free
expression during the war, and thus began the long development of
first amendment doctrine.
During World War II, in contrast to prior wartime periods,
freedom of speech to oppose the war or criticize its conduct was not
seriously infringed. This unusual turn of events may have been due,
in part, to the increasing judicial protection afforded free expression
through the first amendment, particularly by the liberal decisions which
began in 1930 under the Hughes Court, and the ensuing education of
public opinion that those decisions engendered. Some of these gains
* This article is a chapter in a forthcoming book on freedom of expression.
t Lines Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B. 1928, LL.B. 1931, Yale University.
1 For a collection of materials dealing with these periods, see 1 T. EMERsoN,
D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CiviL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-38
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were lost during the McCarthy era in the early 1950's, which coincided
with the hostilities in Korea. On the whole, however, the free speech
issues of that period did not relate directly to the war itself, but rather
to a more general fear of Communism within the United States.
At the present time, during the Vietnam hostilities, the controversy over freedom of speech in wartime has moved to another level.
The general right to oppose the war by speech is fully recognized, but
there are, as always, serious problems of realizing in practice the
acknowledged rights guaranteed in theory. More important, however,
new modes of opposition have developed which raise different issues
concerning the border area between expression and action.
The purpose of this article is to explore some of these questions,
2
In
employing first amendment doctrines I have proposed elsewhere.
briefest summary, the thesis of these doctrines is that maintenance of
a system of freedom of expression requires recognition of the distinction between those forms of conduct which should be classified as
"expression" and those which should be classified as "action"; and that
conduct classifiable as "expression!' is entitled to complete protection
against governmental infringement, while "action" is subject to reasonable and non-discriminatory regulation designed to achieve a legitimate
social objective. Under this theory, "expression" is functionally defined. The definition is based upon the individual and social purposes
served by freedom of expression in a democratic society; upon the
administrative requirements for maintaining an effective system of
free expression in actual operation; and upon the proposition that,
normally, harm inheres not in such conduct itself, but resides only in
the ensuing "action." This theory requires the court to determine
in every case whether the conduct involved is "expression," and, if so,
whether such expression has been infringed by the exercise of governmental authority. Where the court so finds, the regulation must be
declared invalid under the first amendment. The test is not one of
clear and present danger, of incitement or balancing of interests. The
balance of interests was struck when the first amendment was put into
the Constitution. The function of a court in applying the first amendment is to define the key terms of that provision: "speech" (or expression), "abridge," and "law." The definitions of "abridge" and
"law," like the definition of "expression," must be functional in character, derived from the basic considerations underlying a system of
freedom of expression. Where the court finds that "expression" is
2
T. EmERsoN, TowiiuD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FiRST AMENDMENT (1966).
The material was first published in an article of the same title in 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963).
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"abridged" by "law," the doctrine of full protection for expression must
be applied.
This article deals with the main problem areas concerning freedom
of expression as it relates to war and defense.3 These areas include
(1) the law of treason; (2) general criticism of the war effort;
(3) more specific forms of expression which may lead to insubordination in the armed forces, obstruction of recruitment, or resistance to
conscription; (4) other forms of protest; and (5) practical problems
of protecting wartime dissent against illegitimate harassment. Issues
relating to marches and demonstrations, issues which do not differ
greatly from those involved in the right of assembly generally, are not
covered here.
I. THE LAW OF TREASON

Historically, one of the major legal weapons employed by governments to protect themselves against external and internal dangers has
been the crime of treason. In England before the nineteenth century,
and to a lesser extent in the American colonies, treason was given a
very broad definition. It was used to eliminate almost any form of
political opposition, violent or peaceful, by action or by utterance. When
the American revolutionaries came to draw up the Constitution they
took particular care to give the crime of treason a limited meaning and
8 One factor requires brief notice here. When dealing with freedom of expression
connected with war or defense, there must be some delineation of the boundaries between the civilian and military sectors of our society. Generally speaking, the military
sector embraces the conduct of military operations and the internal governance of the
military establishment. The latter includes the military law governing the armed
forces, martial law, and military government of occupied territory. This military
system is outside the civilian system of freedom of expression and is subject to different
rules. See generally, Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review
of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 40 (1961); Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 181 (1962) ; Note, ConstitutionalRights of
Servicemen Before Courts-Martial,64 COLUm. L. REv. 127 (1964) ; Note, The Court
of Military Appeals and the Bill of Rights: A New Look, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 435
(1967) ; Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380 (1966).
The problem, then, is to determine when civilian expression enters the domain of
the military, and when members of the military are under the protection of the civilian
system. Some of the points of contact are clear. Certainly, general discussion of the
organization, procedures or operations of the military by civilians is well within the
system of free expression, indeed is essential to maintaining the principle of civilian
control. Similarly, expression dealing with all facets of the civilian economy which
supplies the armed forces is part of the civilian sector. On the other hand, communications dealing with military movements in wartime are plainly subject to military
censorship. Likewise, dissemination of information classified as a military secret is
subject to controls based on the requirements of the military system, although the issue
of what constitutes a military secret may be subject to civilian judicial review. Access
to military installations for purposes of exercising the right of free speech is also
subject to different rules than is access to non-military public places. More difficult
questions involve the extent to which civilian communication can be addressed across
the border to members of the military, as in the insubordination cases, and the rights
of a member of the military to enjoy the benefits of the free expression system when
temporarily acting in a civilian capacity.
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to surround it with procedural safeguards. The provision they included in the Constitution, one of the few protections for individual
rights embodied in the original document, reads as follows:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.4
Thus, the crime of treason is given an express constitutional
definition which cannot be extended by any act of the legislature or
judiciary. The statute which officially establishes the offense follows
the constitutional provision, simply making it explicit that the crime
can be committed "within the United States or elsewhere." '
The treason provision of the Constitution has been uniformly
interpreted to mean that the crime of treason cannot be committed
solely through expression, but only through some form of action. This
interpretation is based in part upon the constitutional requirement of
an overt act. However, it is primarily an attempt to follow the intent
of the framers. In Cramer v. United States,6 the leading decision
concerning the treason provision, the Court said: "Historical materials
aid interpretation chiefly in that they show two kinds of dangers against
which the framers were concerned to guard the treason offense:
(1) perversion by established authority to repress peaceful political
opposition .

.

.

."

It added: "The concern uppermost in the

framers' minds, that mere mental attitudes or expressions should not
be treason, influenced both definition of the crime and procedure for
its trial." ' The dissenters, disagreeing with the majority on the
extent to which the required "overt act" must indicate the whole
crime, agreed that expression alone could not constitute treason:
"[T]he requirement of an overt act is designed to preclude punishment
for treasonable plans or schemes or hopes which have never moved
out of the realm of thought or speech." '
Under the treason provision, therefore, the test is not whether the
expression has a tendency to aid and comfort the enemy, or presents
a clear and present danger of doing so. Nor is the interest in national
4 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3. On the history of the law of treason and the adoption
of the treason provision in the Constitution, see Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1,
8-35 (1945) ; Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARv. L. REv. 226, 395, 806
(1944-45) ; materials cited in PoLrriCAL AND Civu RIGHTs 74-75.
5 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1964).
6 325 U.S. 1 (1945).

7Id. at 27.

81d. at 28.
at 61. For further material in support of the proposition, see Hurst, Treason
in the United States, 58 H v. L. REv. 806, 830-31 (1945).
9Id.
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security balanced against the interest in freedom of expression. Rather,
the test is whether the conduct in question constitutes expression or
action. While in most of the decided cases the activity alleged to be
treasonous has clearly come within the action category, a group of
cases arising out of World War II present a closer issue. In Gillars v.
United States,'" it was charged that the defendants were guilty of
treason in making broadcasts from enemy territory under the sponsorship of the enemy government, as part of the psychological warfare
directed against American soldiers and citizens. The argument that
the broadcasts constituted only expression and hence could not be
treason was rejected by Judge Charles Fahy in the following terms:
While the crime [of treason] is not committed by mere
expression of opinion or criticism, words spoken as part of
a program of propaganda warfare, in the course of employment by the enemy in its conduct of the war against the
United States, to which the accused owes allegiance, may be
an integral part of the crime. There is evidence in this case
of a course of conduct on behalf of the enemy in the prosecution of its war against the United States. The use of speech
to this end, as the evidence permitted the jury to believe, made
acts of words."
The court seems quite right in construing the conduct in the broadcast
cases as constituting "action" rather than "expression." The more
significant point, however, is the recognition that, under the law of
treason, expression is fully protected and only action (even when the
charge is treason) is subject to governmental sanctions.
This interpretation of the treason clause is arrived at independently
of the first amendment. Indeed, at the time the treason provision was
included in the Constitution the first amendment was not yet a part
of that document. But the same result should be reached by way of
the first amendment. It is clear that this amendment applies to
prosecutions for treason, as it does to the exercise of all other governmental powers. And the basic test for the first amendment's protection,
that expression must be distinguished from action, is the same as that
which is in fact used in interpreting the treason clause. The treason
provision, both in theory and in practice, thus lends support to the
10 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
". The same result could be reached by considering punishment for broadcasting
on behalf of an enemy in time of war justified as falling within the sphere of military
operations, see note 3 supra, and thus not within the system of freedom of expression.
This seems to have been the theory in a similar case in which the opinion was rendered
by judge Calvert Magruder. Chandler v. United States, 171 F._, 921 (1st Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). For other broadcasting cases, which did not find it
necessary to discuss the expression-action problem, see D'Aquino v. United States,
192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952) ; Best v. United States,
184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).
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position that the first amendment affords full protection to all conduct
classifiable as "expression."
The crime of treason, of course, does not exist at all in the absence
of a declared war. It thus has played no part in connection with
protests against the Vietnam conflict.

II.

GENERAL CRITICISM OF WAR OR DEFENSE EFFORT

During the Civil War, opposition which took the form of expression was controlled, to the extent that any control was attempted,
by executive measures. In general, the problem was considered to be
military in nature, and was dealt with in the same way as was the
military conduct of the war. The writ of habeas corpus was suspended
and many persons accused of disloyal utterances were confined to
military prisons. In some areas martial law was declared and the press
shut down or censored. The Post Office was closed to "treasonable
correspondence" and passport controls were instituted."2
During World War I, restrictions on antiwar expression, which
were both widespread and intensive, were based primarily upon specific
legislation enacted for that purpose. The Espionage Act of 1917,13 in
addition to dealing with actual espionage "4and protection of military
security, provided:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with
intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military
or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success
of its enemies and whoever, when the United States is at
war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval
forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or both. 5
3-2 See generally, H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE
J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER
LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951); D. SPRAGUE, FREEDOM UNDER LINCOLN (1965); and materials collected in POLITICAL AND CIvIL RIGHTS 45-48.
13 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, 40 Stat. 217.
14 Perhaps a word should be added concerning the classification of espionage as
"action." It is true that espionage usually involves the communication of information,
and this standing alone would normally be considered "expression." But espionage
realistically takes place in a context of action; the espionage apparatus is engaged
primarily in conduct that dwarfs any element of expression. Moreover, most espionage
consists of conveying information concerning military secrets and would fall within the
system of military operations. Hence espionage is not that form of civilian, domestic
expression that is embraced within the system of freedom of expression.
15 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat 219, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a)

WARREN CouRT 221-47 (1966);

(1964).
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Another provision of the Act made punishable the mailing of any
matter advocating treason, insurrection, forcible resistance to any law
of the United States, or violating any of the other provisions of
the Act.'
In 1918 the Espionage Act was amended 1 to bring within its
prohibitions a variety of other offenses, including saying or doing
anything with intent to obstruct the sale of United States bonds,
except by way of bona fide and not disloyal advice; uttering, printing,
writing, or publishing any language intended to incite resistance to the
United States or promote the cause of its enemies, or any disloyal,
profane, scurrilous, or abusive language, or language intended to cause
contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute regarding the form of government of the United States, the Constitution, the flag, or the uniform
of the Army or Navy; urging any curtailment of production of any
things necessary to the prosecution of the war with intent to hinder
its prosecution; advocating, teaching, defending, or suggesting the
doing of any of these acts; and speaking or acting in support or favor
of the cause of any country at war with the United States.18 Many
states enacted similar legislation, some of it even more broadly worded.
These laws were vigorously enforced. Almost two thousand
prosecutions were brought under the federal statutes and many others
under the state legislation. The resulting suppression has been described by Professor Chafee:
It became criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead
of bond issues, to state that conscription was unconstitutional
though the Supreme Court had not yet held it valid, to say
that the sinking of merchant ships was legal, to urge that a
referendum should have preceded our declaration of war, to
say that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ. Men
have been punished for criticizing the Red Cross and the
Y.M.C.A., while under the Minnesota Espionage Act it has
been held a crime to discourage women from knitting by the
remark, "No soldier ever sees those socks." 9
As a result of these wartime prosecutions the attention of the
courts was directed to the constitutional protection of free speech em16 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. XII, 40 Stat. 230, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1717

(1964).

17 Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, repealed, Act of March 3, 1921,
ch. 136, 41 Stat 1360.
18 Id. The summary is taken from Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 40-41 (1941).
For other ma19 Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 51-52 (1941).
terial on the status of freedom of expression in World War I, see PoUrrICAL AND CIVIP
RiGHTS 60-61; Note, Legal Techniques for Protecting Free Discission in Wartime,
51 YALE L.J. 798 (1942).
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bodied in the first amendment. Ultimately a number of cases reached
the Supreme Court, although no decisions were rendered until after the
war was over. It was in these cases, as noted above, that the Supreme
Court began the remarkable development of first amendment doctrine
which has continued to the present day. At the outset, however, the
development was hesitant and faltering. In every case the Court,
applying the clear and present danger test, rejected first amendment
claims.
The first decision, Schenck v. United States,"0 illustrates the
Court's attitude and approach. Schenck, who was general secretary
of the Socialist Party, and others, were indicted under the Espionage
Act of 1917 for conspiring to obstruct recruiting and cause insubordination in the armed forces. The charge was based upon the fact
that Schenck had distributed a leaflet opposing the war and the draft,
some of the copies of which had reached men who had been drafted.
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, described the leaflet as
follows:
The document in question upon its first printed side
recited the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment, said
that the idea embodied in it was violated by the Conscription
Act and that a conscript is little better than a convict. In
impassioned language it intimated that conscription was
despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against
humanity in the interest of Wall Street's chosen few. It said
"Do not submit to intimidation," but in form at least confined
itself to peaceful measures such as a petition for repeal of the
act. The other and later printed side of the sheet was headed
"Assert Your Rights." It stated reasons for alleging that
any one violated the Constitution when he refused to recognize "your right to assert your opposition to the draft," and
went on "If you do not assert and support your rights, you
are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the
solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States
to retain." It described the arguments on the other side as
coming from cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist
press, and even silent consent to the conscription law as
helping to support an infamous conspiracy. It denied the
power to send our citizens away to foreign shores to shoot up
the people of other lands, and added that words could not
express the condemnation such cold-blooded ruthlessness
deserves, &c., &c., winding up "You must do your share to
maintain, support and uphold the rights of the people of this
country." "
20 249

21

U.S. 47 (1919).

Id. at 50-51.
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On the first amendment issue Justice Holmes' opinion was abrupt
and begrudging. "It may well be," he said, "that the prohibition of
laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints." 2 But he made it clear that the first amendment did not
protect all speech: "The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic." '3 He then went on to enunciate the clear and present danger
test:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.2 4
Without specifically finding that the leaflet without more created
such a clear and present danger, the opinion concluded by affirming the
convictions.
Other cases went even further in sanctioning curtailment of wartime expression under the Espionage Act of 1917. Eugene V. Debs,
the Socialist leader, was prosecuted for creating insubordination in the
armed forces on the basis of a speech in which he denounced the war
as a capitalist plot and supported fellow socialists who had been convicted of resisting the draft. His most extreme statement was, "You
need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery and
Debs was given a ten-year sentence and the
cannon fodder." '
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the conviction."0 The officers of
a German-language newspaper were found guilty of violating the
provision against false news reports in publishing articles slanted
toward the German position 2 7 And Victor Berger's Milwaukee
Leader was denied second-class mailing privileges for printing editorials, strongly pro-German in tone, attacking the war and the draft.2"
The extreme provisions of the 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act
were likewise upheld in Abrams v. United States, 9 where the defend22Id. at 51.
23Id. at 52.
24Id.
25

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919).
26249 U.S. 211. Debs, aged 63, served in prison from April 13, 1919, until
Christmas Day 1921, when President Harding released him without restoration of
citizenship. In 1920, while in prison, Debs ran for President on the Socialist ticket,
receiving 919,799 votes.
27 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
28United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democrat Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921). For denial of second class mailing privileges for even less outspoken material, see Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.), reversing
244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (L. Hand, J.).
29250 U.S. 616 (1919). For a collection of cases and materials, see POITIcAl,
Am CIVI. RIGHTS 77-83.
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ants had thrown, out of a window and into the street, militantly worded
leaflets calling for a general strike. Starting with the Abrams case,
Justices Holmes and Brandeis began to express dissenting views. But
a majority of the Court held firmly to the position that any expression
which showed a tendency to interfere with the war effort could validly
be suppressed. The clear and present danger test, while accepted in
theory, was not applied in practice to check this result.
At the outbreak of World War II, statutes restricting wartime
dissent were on the books, ready to be enforced. Although the 1918
amendments to the Espionage Act were repealed in 1921 'o and have
never been revived, the original 1917 Act,3 applicable only in time
of war, remained in force.

The passage of the Smith Act in 1940,32

moreover, added a somewhat similar provision not limited to wartime.
This provision made it unlawful
for any person, with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty, morale or discipline of the military or
naval forces of the United States(1) to advise, counsel, urge or in any manner cause or
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval
forces of the United States; or
(2) to distribute any written or printed matter which advises,
counsels, or urges insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny,
or refusal of duty by any member of the military or
naval forces of the United States.3
And the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940,31 the first draft
law enacted after World War I, established criminal penalties for any
person "who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to evade registration or service" or any of the requirements of the Act. 5
The Espionage Act of 1917, the Smith Act, and the Selective
Service and Training Act of 1940 continued in effect throughout
World War IL Nevertheless, by this time both judicial and public
attitudes toward general criticism of the war had somewhat mollified.
There were a few prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917 but
only one case reached the Supreme Court; " there, a conviction was
30

Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1360.

31 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, 40 Stat 217.
32 Act

of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, §§ 1-5, 54 Stat. 670, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2387

(1964).
33

Id. § 1(a).

of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, as amended 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a)
(1964) [hereinafter referred to as section 462(a) ].
35 Id. § 11 (a).
36
Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944). See also United States v.
Pelley, 132 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764 (1943).
34Act
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reversed for want of sufficient evidence, the Court not reaching the
first amendment issues. A prosecution was commenced in the District
of Columbia against twenty-eight alleged pro-Nazis for conspiracy to
violate the insubordination provisions of the Smith Act. But the
trial judge died after seven months of trial and the prosecution was
not reinstituted. 37 A prosecution was also instituted against eighteen
members of the Socialist Workers Party in Minneapolis under these
and other provisions of the Smith Act. Here a conviction was
obtained and affirmed by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
denying certiorari. 8 The one conviction under the Selective Service
Act which came before the Supreme Court was reversed for want of
sufficient evidence.39
The new attitude and changed position of the Supreme Court were
4" the only case it decided
clearly reflected in Taylor v. Mississippi,
during World War II involving a state sedition law. Two members
of the Jehovah's Witnesses had been convicted under a Mississippi
statute prohibiting the teaching or dissemination of literature "designed
and calculated to encourage violence, sabotage, or disloyalty to the
government of the United States, or the state of Mississippi." 41 They
were charged with making statements such as "It was wrong for our
President to send our boys across in uniform to fight our enemies,"
and "these boys were being shot down for no purpose at all." The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Although the doctrinal basis
of the decision is not precisely stated, the point of view is clear:
The statute as construed in these cases makes it a criminal offense to communicate to others views and opinions
respecting government policies, and prophecies concerning the
future of our own and other nations. As applied to the
appellants, it punishes them although what they communicated
is not claimed or shown to have been done with an evil or
sinister purpose, to have advocated or incited subversive
action against the nation or state, or to have threatened any
clear and present danger to our institutions or our Government. What these appellants communicated were their beliefs
and opinions concerning domestic measures and trends in
national and world affairs.
37

See United States v. McWilliams, 54 F. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1944). The indictment was later dismissed for failure to prosecute. United States v. McWilliams,
163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
:38 Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. dended, 320 U.S. 790

(1943).

3
9 Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945). See generally, on the World
War II cases, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 83-84; Note, The Effect of the First
Amendment on FederalControl of Draft Protests, 13 V L. L. REV. 347, 348-54 (1968).
40 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
41Id. at 584.
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sanctions cannot be imUnder our decisions criminal
42

posed for such communication.

The right of dissent in wartime has recently become a major
issue once again with the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam. The
existing statutory base for imposing restrictions on antiwar protest
(in the form of expression rather than action) consists of:
(1) The Espionage Act of 1917.43 In its original form this
legislation was to be in effect only "when the United States is at war,"
and of course no official declaration of war has been made. In 1953,
however, Congress enacted legislation providing that the Espionage
Act of 1917 should remain in force "until six months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on
December 16, 1950 .

.

. or such earlier date as may be prescribed

by concurrent resolution of Congress." 4 The 1950 proclamation of
national emergency has continued in effect.4
(2) The Smith Act of 1940.46
remains unchanged.

The provision quoted above 4 7

(3) The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 48
(also known as the Selective Service Act). This statute, a successor
to the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940,"' now provides that
anyone "who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or
evade registration in the armed forces or any of the requirements of
this title," or anyone "who shall knowingly hinder or interfere or
attempt to do so in any way, by force or violence or otherwise, with
the administration of this title . .

.

or the rules or regulations made

pursuant thereto," is guilty of an offense punishable by five years in
prison or a $10,000 fine, or both.5"
Despite the wording of these statutes, and their very early interpretations, it is now completely clear that general opposition to the
4

2

d. at 590 (footnotes omitted).

Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, 40 Stat. 217.
44 Act of June 30, 1953, ch. 175, 67 Stat. 133, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2391 (1964).
43

45 Proclamation

No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Supp. 1958), 50 U.S.C. App. at 9497

(1964).
46Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, §§ 1-5, 54 Stat. 670, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2387
(1964).
Text accompanying note 33 supra.
48 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964).
49 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
For some of the state laws in the area, see
50 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964).
Note, The States, the Federal Constitution, and the War Protestors, 53 COR EmL L.
47

RExv. 528, 535-36 (1968).
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war or defense effort, no matter how vigorously asserted, is constitutionally protected. The fact that such expression might reach
members of the armed forces or have some detrimental effect on the
operation of the draft is not sufficient reason for denying that protection. The case of Bond v. Floyd,51 decided in 1966, makes this clear.
Julian Bond, a Negro, had been elected to the Georgia House of
Representatives. He was refused his seat by the legislature because
of statements by him opposing the draft and criticizing United States
policies in Vietnam. Among the offending statements was one by the
Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, which Bond, then
SNCC's Communications Director, had endorsed. It declared in part:
We believe the United States government has been
deceptive in its claims of concern for freedom of the Vietnamese people, just as the government has been deceptive in
claiming concern for the freedom of colored people in such
other countries as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South
Africa, Rhodesia and in the United States itself.
Samuel Young [a Negro] was murdered because United
States law is not being enforced. Vietnamese are murdered
because the United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in
violation of international law. The United States is no
respecter of persons or law when such persons or laws run
counter to its needs and desires.
• We maintain that our country's cry of "preserve
freedom in the world" is a hypocritical mask behind which it
squashes liberation movements which are not bound, and
refuse to be bound, by the expediencies of United States cold
war policies.
We are in sympathy with, and support, the men in this
country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft which
would compel them to contribute their lives to United States
aggression in Viet Nam in the name of the "freedom" we
find so false in this country.
We therefore encourage those Americans who prefer to
use their energy in building democratic forms within this
country. We believe that work in the civil rights movement
and with other human relations organizations is a valid
alternative to the draft. We urge all Americans to seek this
alternative, knowing full 52well it may cost their lives-as
painfully as in Viet Nam.
U.S. 116 (1966).
1d. at 119-21.
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The Supreme Court unanimously held that the refusal to seat
Bond violated his first amendment rights. As to the right of general
opposition to the Vietnam war the Court said:
Certainly there can be no question but that the First
Amendment protects expressions in opposition to national
foreign policy in Vietnam and to the Selective Service system.
The State does not contend otherwise. 53
If one compares the statement upheld in the Bond case with those
denied protection in Schenk and Debs, the distance traversed in first
amendment interpretation is quite apparent. The development had
taken place in decisions relating to first amendment protection of expression in circumstances not involving wartime dissent, but the Bond
case confirmed the application of the broader meaning of the first
amendment to the war and defense situation.
In doctrinal terms, however, the Bond case is not very enlightening. The Court simply declared that the statement in question was
protected by the first amendment and found no need to elaborate.
There was no talk of clear and present danger, or of balancing. The
Bond case does suggest, however, that the doctrine demanding complete
protection for expression has strong judicial support in this area. Free
and open discussion of war and defense issues is essential to the life
of a democracy. As the World War I experience demonstrates, restrictions on speech of this character, whereby "expression" as well
as "action" is inhibited, can easily reach such proportions and have
such a stifling effect as to bring the nation close to a police state.
Thus, in the mid-1960's, the general right to express strong dissent to war and defense policies has been broadly accepted, certainly
in theory if not always in practice. Both government officials and
public opinion have come, if not to appreciate the full value, at least
to recognize the inevitability of such protest in a society that aspires
to remain democratic. 5 4 By this time, indeed, the legal issues have
shifted and the question is no longer one involving the general right
of open dissent. The controversial areas have become (1) the extent
to which the first amendment protects expression specifically urging
531d. at 132.
For a discussion of the Bond case, see Finegold, Julian Bond and the FirstAmend-

inent Balance, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 167 (1967).

See also Wolin v. Port of New York

Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), upholding the right to distribute anti-war

leaflets in the Port Authority terminal; Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), holding that the New York City Transit

Authority, which rented advertising space in the subways, could not refuse advertising
in the form of anti-war posters.
5 See, e.g., President Johnson's press conference reported in the N.Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
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resistance to the Selective Service laws; and (2) the constitutional line
between "expression" and "action" employed in various forms of
protest.

Il.

EXPRESSION SPECIFICALLY URGING OR ADVISING

INSUBORDINATION OR RESISTANCE
TO THE

DRAFT

As dissent concerning war or defense policy moves from the
general to the particular, it begins to raise more controversial questions.
And as it is directed towards the armed forces and their system of
recruiting, it touches especially sensitive areas. These are precisely
the issues which opposition to the Vietnam war has brought to the
fore today, and which the courts must now face.
Unfortunately, existing case law on the subject is sparse, mostly
out of date, and generally unsatisfactory. Shortly after enactment of
the 1948 Selective Service Act several cases were brought under
section 462(a). One case involved Dr. Wirt A. Warren, a Kansas
physician. Dr. Warren was a Unitarian and a pacifist, opposed to all
wars on religious grounds. He "advised, counseled and urged" his
stepson not to register for the draft and offered to provide funds for
him to go to Canada or Mexico. The stepson rejected the advice and
registered. Dr. Warren was convicted and sentenced to two years in
The Supreme Court
prison; his conviction was upheld on appeal."
6
denied certiorari.'
On the first amendment issue, the court of appeals'
view was
Freedom of religion and freedom of speech, guaranteed
by the First Amendment, with respect to acts and utterances
calculated to interfere with the power of Congress to provide
for the common defense and to insure the survival of the
nation are qualified freedoms. They may not be construed
so as to prevent legislation necessary for national security,7
indeed, that may be necessary for our survival as a nation.1
In another case, Larry Gara, Dean of Men at Bluffton College
(a Mennonite institution), was prosecuted under the same provision.
Dean Gara was a Quaker who had himself refused to register in
World War I and considered it his religious duty to oppose all forms
of cooperation with war. He had consistently advocated that men of
draft age, who opposed war on grounds of conscience, should refuse
to register. The particular incident for which Gara was indicted
55 Warren v. United States, 177 F2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949).
56338 U.S. 947 (1950).
17 177 F.Zd at 599 (footnote omitted).
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involved a student at the college who was arrested for failing to
register. Gara, present at the arrest, said to the student, "Do not let
them coerce you into registering." The district court held that, since
the student had a continuing duty to register, this counsel violated
the Act. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 8 On the first
amendment issue, the court conceded that general expression of opinion
opposed to the Selective Service Act "might well be protected." But
it held that this protection did not extend to counseling others to violate
the law, "the counseling being also expressly forbidden by statute":
No decision has been handed down by the Supreme Court
holding that violation of an express statute enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power to provide
for the common defense is excused under the First Amendment because the acts of violation are consummated, as counseling always must be, through the medium of words. 9
The Supreme Court, dividing four to four, affirmed without opinion.6
While the Warren and Gara cases indicate the nature of the problem, neither opinion throws much light on the first amendment issue.
The courts simply failed to come to grips with the question, at least in
terms that would be required by the first amendment theory enunciated
above.
The later decision of the Supreme Court in Bond v. Floyd," already mentioned, is not much more helpful. The Court there expressly
held that "Bond could not have been constitutionally convicted under
50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (a)."

62

His statements "were at worst unclear

on the question of the means to be adopted to avoid the draft" and
did "not demonstrate any incitement to violation of law." ' The Court
was plainly moving away from the Warren and Gara cases. But it
did not make clear how far it would go, nor did it elaborate the doctrinal basis of its holding. Further analysis of the problem is necessary.
If one examines the actual forms of communication employed in
opposition to the draft during the Vietnam war, they appear to fall into
three categories, representing a progression. The first category comprises that expression which does not specifically advise or urge anyone
to violate existing law. Many persons, of course, have urged others
not to enlist voluntarily in the armed services. Many individuals and
groups offer advice about the rights of conscientious objectors and the
Z8 Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949).

59 Id.at 41.
60 340 U.S. 857 (1950).
61385 U.S. 116 (1966).
621d. at 133.
63 Id- at 133-34.
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most effective way to present a case for a conscientious objector classification. Others go further and urge potential draftees to file conscientious objector forms, whether or not they are clearly qualified,
and even though it may burden the Selective Service machinery.
The second category is made up of communication which advises
or urges persons of draft age not to register, not to submit to induction,
or not to cooperate with the Selective Service system in other ways.
Such advice or exhortation may be limited to support of those who
already have moral or religious scruples against service in the armed
forces, or it may be addressed to a wider audience. In either case the
action urged, if taken by the draftee, would constitute a violation of the
Selective Service Act. The communication might vary widely in its
impact, depending on such factors as whether it was in writing or in
speech, addressed to a large group or to an individual, couched mildly
as advice or intensely as urging, issued by an individual or by an
organization, or uttered outside an induction center or at a dinner in
the ballroom of a luxury hotel.
Expression urging or advising this form of resistance to the draft
has been widespread and open. In September of 1967, for example,
a group of 320 ministers, professors, writers, and others, many of them
well known in their several fields, signed a document entitled "A Call
to Resist Illegitimate Authority." In it they recounted various methods
of resistance to the war being used by different persons, noting that
"some are refusing to be inducted." The signers approved these efforts,
saying: "We believe that each of these forms of resistance against
illegitimate authority is courageous and justified." "4 Shortly afterwards, eighteen Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish leaders, joined
by fifty delegates to the United States Conference on Church and
Society, issued a public statement in which they declared: "We hereby
publicly counsel all who in conscience cannot today serve in the armed
forces to refuse such service by non-violent means." 65 Similar expressions have been made by numerous organizations and individuals.
The constitutional issues involved in this form of expression seem
to be raised by the indictment, in January of this year, of five members
of the group which had issued "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority."
The defendants, Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Michael Ferber,
Mitchell Goodman, Marcus Raskin, and Dr. Benjamin Spock, were
charged with conspiracy to "counsel, aid and abet diverse Selective
Service registrants" to "refuse and evade service" and to "fail and
refuse to have in their personal possession" registration certificates and
64

THE Nzw REPuBLIc, Oct. 7, 1967, at 35.
65 N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1967, at 10, col. 8.
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notices of classification (draft cards), as required by the Selective

Service regulations; and with conspiracy to "hinder and interfere" with
the administration of the Selective Service Act, all in violation of
section 462(a).6' More specifically, the alleged conspiracy is that the
defendants agreed that they "would sponsor and support a nationwide program of resistance" to the Selective Service system; that some
of them "would conduct and participate in a public meeting at the
Arlington Street Church, Boston," at which they "would accept
possession" of draft cards; that the defendants would "participate in a
demonstration of resistance" at the Department of Justice Building in
Washington on October 20, 1967, at which draft cards "surrendered
and collected at various demonstrations . . . held in various communities throughout the United States" would be "collected . . . and

deposited in a common repository"; that defendant Coffin would
address registrants and others participating in the demonstration,
"publicly counselling said registrants .

.

. to continue to refuse to

serve in the armed forces"; and that four of the defendants "would
deliver to the Attorney General of the United States the aforesaid
repository" containing the draft cards. Most, or all, of the alleged
falling within the
conspiracy would seem to involve communications
67
second category of current means of war protest.

The third category of expression includes advice or instruction in
various illegal methods of evading the draft-for example, how to feign
insanity, drug addiction, homosexuality, chronic illness, or the like.
Communications of this sort could be made under a variety of circumstances, ranging from a casual remark to a thorough training in the
preferred technique of deception. In actuality, while such communications undoubtedly have taken place, they are not normally given
publicity and an estimate of their frequency is not possible.6"
66 Indictment, United States v. Coffin, Crim. No. 68-1-F (D. Mass., Jan. 5, 1968).
67 For news accounts of the Department of Justice demonstration on October 20,
1967, see N.Y. Times, October 21, 1967, at 8, col. 3; Grauman, After the Mobilization:
The Goals of Dissent, 205 THE NATION 617, 619-20 (1967).
Some of the conduct by the registrants, which conduct the defendants are charged
with conspiring to counsel, aid and abet, might not constitute a violation of law. In
addition, it is not clear to what extent turning in draft cards or failing to have personal
possession of them is protected by the first amendment. For a discussion of this issue,
which involves drawing the line between "expression" and "action," see text accompanying notes 83-84 infra. It should be noted here, however, that insofar as the conduct
urged on the registrants was not a violation of law, the communication by the defendants would fall into the first category noted above, rather than the second.
After a four week trial, four of the defendants were convicted and one (Marcus
Raskin) acquitted. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1968, at 1, col. 3.
18 For references to additional newspaper and other reports of war protests, see
Note, The States, the Federal Constitution, and the War Protestors, 53 CORNELL L.
Rxv. 528, 528-29 (1968) ; Note, The Effect of the First Ametdment on Federal Coltrol of Draft Protests, 13 Vu-. L. REv. 347, 362-63 (1968).
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Assuming that all these forms of communication in opposition to
the draft are prohibited by a literal reading of the Espionage Act or the
Selective Service Act, to what extent are they protected by the first
amendment? One can analyze the problem in terms of the ad hoc
balancing test, the clear and present danger test, the "incitement" test,
or the expression-action test.
The results under the ad hoc balancing test are highly uncertain.
Balancing the interest in freedom of expression against the interest in
national security or in maintaining the armed forces does not yield any
clear or certain answer. The factors on each side of the scale are in
no way comparable. There is no common ground, or unit of measurement, between the value to national security and the injury to the
system of freedom of expression. Hence there is no standard of reference on which to base a reasoned, functional determination. The
formula is so loose and open-ended, so lacking in judicial guidelines,
that it becomes difficult for a court to do more than confirm (or, perhaps, reject) the judgment of the legislature.
It is possible that under the balancing test the line might fall
between the first and second categories, the first being protected and
the second and third not, on the theory that the action urged in
the first category is not a violation of existing law. But this feature
of the case would not by itself be decisive. The violation factor in
the equation might still be outweighed by other factors favoring freedom of expression. Or the ensuing action, even though not a violation
of law, might be deemed so detrimental to the state as to outweigh the
interest in freedom of expression. There is no readily apparent point
at which to strike the balance. In view of the abstract weight popularly
given to national security in our society, however, it could even be
that the line would be drawn somewhere through the middle of the
first category.
The clear and present danger test presents other difficulties.
Unless one considers the clear and present danger test as identical with
the balancing test, it is useful only as a supplement to that test. In
those situations where the balance (omitting elements of clear and
present danger) is plainly against freedom of expression, the clear and
present danger test can be employed to protect more expression than
plain balancing otherwise would. This is true, for instance, in most
situations where the evil apprehended is a violation of law resulting
from physical violence. Where the balance (apart from clear and
present danger) favors freedom of expression, the clear and present
danger test is not useful; in fact, it becomes restrictive. Thus, where
it is determined that freedom of speech outweighs the interest in
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keeping litter off the streets, the question whether distribution of
leaflets would create a clear and present danger of littering the streets
is irrelevant. In short, the clear and present danger test makes sense
only in those situations where, apart from the clear and present danger
element, the balance of interests would be struck against the first
amendment right.
In the context of anti-draft expression, the clear and present
danger test would operate to protect some speech in all three categories
which would otherwise be outlawed by the balance-of-interests process.
By its very nature, however, expression which did not create a clear
and present danger of persuading the person to whom it was addressed
would tend to be ineffective or innocuous. The clear and present
danger test would be beneficial in limiting the scope of an enforcement
campaign, by cutting down the possibility of bringing prosecutions for
"harmless" expression. But it scarcely seems to meet the needs of a
system of freedom of expression.
The "incitement" test, which may be the test which the Court
used in the Bond case, would operate something like the clear and
present danger test, protecting some portion of expression in all three
categories. The boundaries of protection are, however, even more
vaguely delineated than under the clear and present danger test.
Justice Holmes was correct when he said, "Every idea is an incitement." 69 The concept of "incitement" thus affords no concrete frame
of reference upon which to base a decision. It poses an exercise in
semantics, not concretely related to the function and operations of a
system of freedom of expression. No rational application of the
concept is possible.
The expression-action test would clearly protect all communication
falling within the first and second categories. The dividing line, under
this test, would be drawn somewhere in category three. Within that
category, conduct that amounts to "advice" or "persuasion" would be
protected; conduct that moves into the area of "instructions" or
"preparations" would not. The essential task would be to distinguish
between simply conveying an idea to another person, which idea he
may later act upon, and actually participating with him in the performance of an illegal act. It is true that the distinction does not offer
automatic solutions and that courts could easily disagree on any particular set of facts. But this process of decision-making is related to
the nature of "expression" and the functions and operations of a system
of freedom of expression. It is therefore a rational method of approaching the problem.
69 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
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The basic justification for applying the expression-action test has
been set forth elsewhere and will not be repeated here. But it is fair
to ask whether in the specific context of the military draft the doctrine
is, from a realistic point of view, a viable one. There are strong reasons
for thinking it is.
No one can doubt that the various communications expressing
opposition to the draft during the Vietnam war have been, and continue
to be, a highly significant feature of the process of formulating decisions
made necessary by the crisis in our affairs. Those communications
perform the precise function that expression is intended to serve in a
democratic society. This is true even where the communication advises
or urges violation of the draft law. Indeed, such communication discloses, as no other form of expression could, the intensity of opposition
to the war and the proximity of the nation to irreparable division and
disaster.
Yet the question remains, can society afford to permit all utterances
within the limits of the expression-action rule? This theory of the
first amendment gives to the government full power over the ensuing
action, if any there be. There is no reason why that power cannot
be effectively exercised here. Prosecution for refusal to submit to
induction, or for any other violation of the Selective Service Act, is
always open to the government. If such prosecutions are inadequate
to control the situation, it is inconceivable that prosecution of those
expressing dissent or opposition would do so.
Punishment for expression and restrictions on free speech are
subject to serious limitations in terms of both the requirements of
due process and public expectations of democratic conduct. Repression
might be effective against a small, unpopular minority. But where
it is applied to a substantial and prominent portion of the population
it is almost sure to fail. Moreover, sanctions would be particularly
ineffective against the kind of offenses and offenders involved in draft
protests, where the issues are usually seen as religious and moral ones
and the opinions fiercely held. The beliefs and convictions of most
persons who counsel violation of the draft laws are not lightly tossed
aside when opposition develops. It is difficult to believe that a
campaign of prosecutions aimed at the restriction of expressions of
opinion would have a deterrent effect. Nor would it be likely under
such circumstances to reduce the underlying opposition to the draft.
At the same time, the danger to the system of freedom of expression and to society as a whole inherent in such a policy of repression
would be enormous. Once under way, a campaign to restrict expression would not readily find a stopping place. It would arouse the
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most irrational and divisive forces in the community, and in the end
it could stop encouragement to draft resistance only by curbing all
expression opposing the war.
The problems with respect to communication tending to cause
insubordination in the armed forces are likewise best dealt with through
the expression-action principle. The clear and present danger test, as
the World War I decisions demonstrate, could lead to suppression of
all opposition to the war. So could the balancing test. In actual
practice there would seem to be few occasions when communication
reaching members of the armed forces could have any immediate
effect. Civilians normally do not have access to military installations
for purposes of direct address. Expression must be in the form of writing or, if oral, made to a mixed audience which includes some voluntary
listeners from the armed forces. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Espionage Act and the Smith Act have never been applied in any
situation involving "direct incitement" to mutiny. In any event the
expression-action test would seem completely viable. Here again, if
the sanctions available to punish any ensuing action taking the form of
actual insubordination are not sufficient to safeguard the social interest,
it is hardly likely that punishment of expression will make the difference. And any such attempt can only add to the social disruption or
crush all public discussion of war issues.
IV.

OTHER FORMS OF PROTEST TO WAR OR DEFENSE EFFORTS

Protest against war or defense efforts may take many forms in
addition to those considered in the previous section and those forms
of assembly, such as meetings, parades, picketing and so forth, which
will not be discussed here. As the Vietnam war has progressed,
opposition has been displayed by burning, turning in, and refusing to
carry draft cards; physical obstruction of draft boards; lying down
in front of troop trains; pouring blood over files in draft board offices;
and in numerous other ways. These forms of protest raise squarely the
question whether the conduct involved is to be classified as expression
or action. If the conduct is held to be expression, the further issue
arises whether, and under what principle, it is to be protected. The
applicable doctrines have been considered in the previous section but
the initial problem is the one to which the courts rarely address themselves, namely, what is "expression" protected by the first amendment
and what is "action" not so protected.
Before considering specific instances, certain general features of
the problem should be kept in mind. To some extent expression and
action are always mingled; most conduct includes elements of both.
Even the clearest manifestations of expression involve some action, as
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in the case of holding a meeting, publishing a newspaper, or even
merely talking. At the other extreme, a political assassination includes
a substantial mixture of expression. The guiding principle must be to
determine which element is predominant in the conduct under consideration. Is expression the major element and the action only
secondary? Or is the action the essence and the expression incidental?
The answer, to a great extent, must be based on a common sense
reaction, made in light of the functions and operations of a system of
freedom of expression.
Yet often there is something more to go on-some extrinsic
points of reference which provide useful guides. The problem does
not arise in the abstract, but in the context of whether specific governmental controls are valid or not. Hence in order to determine whether
the governmental control is directed against that element of the conduct
which constitutes expression only, it is sometimes helpful to consider
what comparable forms of action, divorced from expression or the
particular kind of expression involved, are normally subject to governmental control. In the political assassination case, for example, murder
is usually the object of official sanction regardless of what is intended
to be expressed by the murderer. But opening and shutting the mouth,
the action connected with making an address, is not commonly an
object of governmental control. Likewise, other extrinsic factors, such
as the objective of the legislature in framing the regulation, may
indicate whether the government is actually seeking to curtail the
expression element of mixed conduct. The type of sanction invoked is a
useful guide as well; the penalty may be clearly excessive when tested
against the usual sanction applied to comparable conduct when not
combined with the particular expression. Thus the problem of segregating expression and action, or rather separating governmental control
of expression from governmental control of action, is open to some
degree of rational analysis.
These issues have received most attention in the draft card burning
cases. In 1965, as part of the mounting protest to the Vietnam war,
several well-publicized incidents occurred in which persons subject to
the draft publicly burned their registration certificates or notices of
classification. The Selective Service Act did not at the time contain
any provision specifically prohibiting the intentional destruction of
these cards. But the regulations issued by the Selective Service System
required each person registered under the draft to have his card in
possession at all times, 70 and violation of the regulations was punishable
as a violation of the Act, by a fine of $10,000, or imprisonment for five
70

32 C.F.R. §§ 1617.1, 1623.5 (1957).
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years, or both.' Hence a person burning his draft card would later
be subject to prosecution under the regulation for failing to have the
card in his possession. In 1965 Congress passed an amendment to the
Selective Service Act to provide that anyone who "knowingly destroys"
or "knowingly mutilates" his draft card is guilty of an offense under
the Act and subject to its penalties. 2 Following passage of the
amendment the number of draft card burnings increased and several
prosecutions were commenced.
The handling of this rather novel first amendment problem by the
lower federal courts illustrates the uncertainty and poverty of existing
first amendment doctrine. None of the courts gave adequate consideration to the issue of separating expression and action in the
complex situation presented to them. All of them concluded or
assumed, however, that draft card burning includes some expression
and, hence, comes within the protective scope of the first amendment.
They then addressed themselves to the question whether the expression
was protected or unprotected by that constitutional guarantee. None
utilized the clear and present danger test, although the situations have
been those in which the clear and present danger concept would have
been relevant. Rather, all relied upon the balancing test, one balancing
73
in favor of first amendment rights and the others against.

The issue reached the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien7 and, by a vote of seven to one, that Court upheld the statute.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, rejected O'Brien's
argument that the burning of his registration certificate was "symbolic
speech" protected by the first amendment. The essence of the Court's
position is set forth in the following paragraph:
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labelled "speech" whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged
communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to
7150 U.S.C. App. § 462(b) (6) (1964).
7250 U.S.C. App. § 462(b) (3) (Supp. II, 1967).
73 O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1967) (balancing in
favor), rev'd, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968); United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.
1966) (balancing against), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967) ; United States v. Smith,
249 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd per curiam, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966) (balancing against) ; United States v. Cooper, 279 F. Supp. 253 (D. Colo. 1968) (balancing
against).
All the courts balanced the general interest in national security against the interest
in freedom of expression. But more precisely, the question under the balancing test
would seem to be: Does the government's interest in preventing non-possession by
burning (not non-possession in general) outweigh the interest in freedom of expression?
74 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).
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bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily
follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that
when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To
characterize the quality of the governmental interest which
must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive
terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount;
cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms,
we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that
the 1965 amendment to § 462(b) (3) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and consequently that O'Brien can be constitutionally
convicted for violating it.75
The Court then went on to demonstrate that "legislation to insure
the continuing availability of issued certificates serves a legitimate and
substantial purpose in the [draft] system's administration ;" 76 held that
the 1965 amendment "specifically protects this substantial governmental interest ;" 77 and perceived "no alternative means that would
more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of
issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their
willful mutilation or destruction." 78 Finally, the Court rejected the
contention that the purpose of the legislation was specifically to punish
expression, invoking the "familiar principle of constitutional law that
this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." 71
The Court's analysis of what constitutes "expression" covered by
the first amendment is grossly inadequate; its formula for protecting
75Id. at 1678-79 (footnotes omitted).
76d. at 1679.
771d. at 1681.
78 Id.
79 Id.at 1682. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the Court should
have considered the question whether "conscription is permissible in the absence of a
declaration of war," a point not raised before in the case. Id. at 1685. Mr. justice
Marshall did not participate.
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that expression is dangerously weak; and the result reached is completely unrealistic. The Court makes no attempt to determine whether
the conduct of burning a draft card is to be classified as "expression" or
"action." Rather, it assumes there is a "communicative element" in
the conduct, classifies the situation as one where "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined, and holds that regulation'of the "nonspeech" element is permissible, no matter what the effect on the speech
element, so long as it "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest." What this novel analysis does is relegate the
''expression" protected by the first amendment to a "communicative
element" and allow all other aspects of the conduct to be restricted or
suppressed regardless of the impact on freedom of expression. On
this theory, so long as the governmental regulation does not directly
deal with the "communicative element," it may prohibit or control all
other aspects of holding a meeting, marching or demonstrating, distributing literature, exhibiting a motion picture, publishing a newspaper, forming an association, and many other forms of "expression."
The formula would also seem to imply that any "indirect" regulation
of expression, such as loyalty programs, a legislative committee's investigation, a disclosure requirement, and the like, would be upheld so
long as the governmental interest involved were "important or substantial." This degree of protection for expression falls far short of
even that afforded by the balancing test. The Court's view embodies
an artificial, sterile concept of the expression protected by the first
amendment, one wholly incapable of meeting the needs of a modern
system of freedom of expression.
The burning of a draft card is, of course, conduct that involves
both expression and action. Yet it seems quite clear that the predominant element in such conduct is expression (opposition to the
draft) rather than action (destruction of a piece of cardboard). The
registrant is not concerned with secret or inadvertent burning of his
draft card, involving no communication with other persons. The
main feature, for him, is the public nature of the burning, through
which he expresses to the community his ideas and feelings about the
war and the draft.
Moreover, it is apparent that governmental control was directed
at the expression element of draft card burning, not at the action
element. The destruction of a small bit of paper, the action element
involved, is not normally punished by five years in prison. A'different
problem is presented by the fact that the action results in a failure of
the registrant to have a card in his possession and hence interferes with
the operation of the draft system. This problem of insuring the
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"continuing availability of issued certificates" "o can be and is handled
by a different form of legislation. As noted above, the Selective
Service regulations already made it a criminal offense for a registrant
not to have a draft card in his possession. Congress might have
wished to incorporate that prohibition in a formal statute, but it did
not do so. Certainly it would make no sense for Congress to prohibit
loss of possession by reason of burning, rather than loss of possession
generally. What Congress did, in short, was simply to punish a form
of expressing opposition to the draft; the effect of the amendment in
improving the operation of the draft system was trivial and superfluous.
This conclusion is confirmed, though it need not rest upon, the
legislative history of the 1965 amendment. The Supreme Court argues
that the legislative motive cannot be considered if the legislation is
valid on its face. Yet the only consideration necessary is that ordinarily given to a problem of statutory interpretation. Moreover, the
Court itself recognizes an exception to its rule where, as in determining
whether a statute is designed to impose a penalty, "the very nature
of the constitutional question requires an inquiry into legislative
purpose." 8" Surely the exception applies here. When a statute deals
with conduct involving both expression and action, the first amendment
issue turns in part upon the question whether the legislation is directed
at the expression or the action sector of the conduct. If one examines
the legislative history here it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the obvious and indeed acknowledged purpose was, as the Senate
Committee on Armed Services explained, to punish "the defiant destruction and mutilation of draft cards by dissident persons who disapprove of national policy." 82
Having reached this point, the expression-action theory requires
that full protection be extended to the expression and that the statute
be declared invalid. This conclusion is fully justified by all the considerations of theory, practice, and experience mentioned above."
The same analysis applies to the conduct of turning in draft cards.
This method of expressing opposition to the war has come to be
preferred to draft card burning, which has receded into the background
over the past year. Already some thousands of registrants have resoId.at 1679.
81 Id. at 1682 n.30.
82Id. at 1684. Extracts from the committee reports are printed as an appendix
to the Court's opinion. For the debate, see 111 CoNG. Rxc. 19,102; 19,134; 19,669
(1965). The Court's contention that Congress was also concerned with "the smooth
functioning of the Selective Service System" appears, to this reader at least, unsupportable.
83For other discussion of the draft card burning problem, see Velvel, Freedom of
Speech md the Draft Card Brning Cases, 16 KYAx. L. REv. 149 (1968).
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turned their draft cards to Selective Service boards, deposited them with
the Department of Justice, or otherwise surrendered them to some
government official. In making this gesture the quality of expression
clearly prevails over the element of action. The conduct is hardly
different from writing a letter of protest. Actually, the turning in of
draft cards is not, as such, a violation of any express provision of any
existing statute or regulation. It might, of course, be taken as offending the prohibition in section 462 (a) against hindering or interfering
with the administration of the Selective Service Act. In addition, some
draft boards might use it as the basis for ordering immediate induction
of the registrant. But, the conduct being primarily expression, such
direct sanctions would plainly violate the first amendment.
The turning in of a draft card does, however, give rise to collateral
problems. The registrant is then in the position of not having a draft
card in his possession, a violation of the Selective Service regulations.
Some draft boards have applied the sanction of reclassifying the
registrant or accelerating his induction on the ground that he was
"delinquent" under the regulations. The separation of expression and
action under these circumstances involves some difficulties, but they
are not insuperable. The failure to keep a draft card in one's possession
would seem to be conduct classifiable as action, not expression. Though
the initial destruction or return of the card may have been expression
protected by the first amendment, the consequent failure to carry the
draft card is conduct in which the action (or inaction) element predominates. The requirement of carrying identification is not an
uncommon form of regulation. Refusal to comply with such a
regulation on grounds of conscience or belief, although expression, is
no different from refusal to conform to the laws requiring automobile
drivers to carry licenses. The total context, particularly the nature
of the government's interest in relation to the expressive qualities that
have come to be attached to the conduct, differentiate the burning or
turning in of draft cards from a refusal to have them in one's possession.
As action, the failure to have a draft card would not be protected
by the first amendment and would be subject to appropriate sanction.
But such sanction would have to be directed to the action, not to any
accompanying expression. Thus no person could be reclassified after
turning in his draft card except insofar as other persons, willfully failing to have draft cards in their possession for other reasons, are treated
in the same way. And no criminal punishment could be inflicted
greater or different from that customarily employed to maintain
effective operation of the draft system through requiring registrants
to carry draft cards. Thus, the element of expression in the conduct
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could not be penalized by applying a sanction not otherwise invoked
or by aggravating the punishment in any way."'
Laws prohibiting the burning or other desecration of the flag
involve similar issues. All states, as well as the District of Columbia,
have statutes of this type,8" but proposals for expanded federal legislation are frequently made. These statutes are obviously supported by
strong emotions and have never been held to violate constitutional
rights. But their validity under the first amendment is questionable
where the conduct is intended as a symbolic gesture of defiance or
opposition. In such a case the element of expression would seem to
constitute the essential feature of the conduct, or at least the part at
which punishment is being directed. The action element-consisting
of making a fire in the street or some similar act-is incidental to the
expression. The Supreme Court's decision in Stromberg v. California,"8 invalidating one section of the California red flag law, would
seem to support this position.
It is possible to consider desecration of the flag as equivalent to
"fighting words," likely to provoke an immediate breach of the peace,
and therefore classifiable as action. But this seems something of a
stretch. It is also possible to uphold the flag desecration statutes by
applying the balancing test or the clear and present danger test. Yet
ultimately it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that desecration of the
flag, however obnoxious it may be to some of us, is realistically intended as expression and nothing else. It should therefore be treated
as such. For those who may be shocked by this conclusion it is
well to remember that loyalty to the flag, like loyalty to the country,
cannot be coerced.
Certain other forms of protest against the war effort more clearly
consist of conduct in which action predominates and which is therefore
not protected by the first amendment. Mass physical obstruction of
draft boards, induction centers, military installations, or other places
constitutes action, except insofar as the obstruction is an integral part
of the right of assembly. 7 Obstruction of troop movements by lying
down in front of troop trains or blocking traffic on a city street falls
84 This was the position of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in O'Brien

v. United States, 376 F.2d at 541-42, rev'd, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968). But cf. Wills v.
United States, 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967).
The discussion above does not attempt to consider any of the due process, privacy
or other constitutional questions involved in the possession requirement.
85 See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
86283 U.S. 359 (1931). The issue is now before the Supreme Court on appeal
from a conviction under the New York statute. Street v. New York, 20 N.Y.2d 231,
229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967), prob. juris. noted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3483 (June
17, 1968) (No. 688).
87 The right of assembly and the extent to which physical obstruction is justified
in exercise of that right are, as previously pointed out, not discussed in this article.
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within the same category. So also does the more unusual conduct of
pouring blood over Selective Service files."" To attempt to bring such
forms of protest within the expression category would rob the distinction between expression and action of all meaning, and would
make impossible any system of freedom of expression based upon full
protection of expression.
Action protest is often undertaken as a form of civil disobedience.
It is not within the province of this article to deal with that subject.
But a few words should be said on the question whether such civil
disobedience is compatible with a system of freedom of expression.
For present purposes civil disobedience may be defined as conduct
which (1) is in violation of a valid (constitutional) law; (2) is undertaken on the basis of a moral principle held sufficient to overcome the
normal obligation to comply with the law; (3) is non-violent in
nature; and (4) causes no direct injury to other persons. By definition,
civil disobedience constitutes action, not protected expression.
Civil disobedience tends to undermine law and order, at least the
law and order of the moment, which are necessary to the functioning
of a system of freedom of expression. Civil disobedience attempts to
achieve results through a kind of coercion or pressure, at a tense
emotional level, whereas expression usually operates through more
moderate means of persuasion. Enforcement of the law against acts
of civil disobedience may spill over into suppression of freedom of
expression. In these and other ways there is a tension between these
two means of political communication.
In the long run, however, there is no necessary incompatibility
between a system of freedom of expression and a measured amount of
civil disobedience. In some ways civil disobedience serves the same
ends as freedom of expression. By calling attention to the problems
which give rise to such drastic action, it forces reconsideration of the
issues and promotes a better chance to reach consensus. By disclosing
the intensity with which a position is held, it measures an important
factor in the political process. By giving sharp warning of stress in
society, it greatly increases the likelihood of achieving a satisfactory
balance between stability and change. In short, acts of civil disobedience can supplement a system of free expression in rendering a
democratic structure more responsive and more effective.
The principal difference is that civil disobedience is strong medicine. There is no such thing as too much freedom of expression in
8
For an account of this incident see N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1967, at 5, col. 3.
The participants were subsequently convicted of violating the Selective Service Act,
two being sentenced to six years in prison and one to three years. N.Y. Times, May
25, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
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a free society. But there can be an excess of civil disobedience. An
overdose may be fatal. Civil disobedience can be compatible with the
first amendment, as with other institutions of a democratic society, but
its existence is always a signal of danger.
V.

REMEDIES AGAINST HARASSMENT OF DISSENT IN WARTIME

From all that has been said it is apparent that, as a matter of
constitutional theory, the first amendment affords a substantial measure
of protection to expression directed against a war effort. The problem
remains, however, of realizing those rights in practice amid the stresses
of an actual war. It is important to keep in mind, therefore, the nature
of the harassment which can beset a system of freedom of expression
in wartime and the possible role of the courts in affording legal
remedies.
During the Vietnam conflict expression in opposition to the war
has been widespread, increasingly frequent, and on the whole accepted
as a constitutional right. But various forms of harassment have been
developed and employed to stifle dissent. Some of this has come from
high federal officials. President Johnson has, on several occasions,
acknowledged the right of citizens to dissent on war issues, but he
has also let it be known that he "was dismayed by the demonstrations
and has given his full endorsement to the Justice Department's investigation of possible Communist infiltration of the antidraft movement," 89
and, on another occasion, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
"was keeping an eye on 'antiwar activity.' "o
Former Attorney
General Katzenbach told a news conference that "the Justice Department [has] started a national investigation of groups behind the antidraft movement." He added, "There are some Communists involved
in it. .

.

. We may very well have some prosecutions." " Six months

later the national secretary of the Students for a Democratic Society
asserted that there "seems to be a national investigation" of his organization by the F.B.I.9 2 There was also evidence that opposition to the
Vietnam war was being taken as unfavorable evidence in loyaltysecurity investigations.93
Similar attacks upon wartime dissent have come from the legislative branch. Many individual legislators, on and off the floor of
89 N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1965, at 1, col. 8.
90 N.Y. Times, April 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
91 N.Y.

Times, Oct. 18, 1965, at 1, col. 6.

92 N.Y.
9

Times, April 19, 1966, at 6, col. 1.

3 American Civil Liberties Union Bull. No. 2259, Mar. 7, 1966.
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4
Congress, have denounced opposition to the war as disloyal conduct .
In 1965 the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee made public a
staff report which attacked a number of individuals as having "persistent records of Communist sympathies and/or of association with
known Communists and known Communist movement and front
organizations," 01 and asserted that the antiwar demonstrations had

"clearly passed .

.

. into the hands of Communists and extremist

elements." "6 No opportunity was given the named individuals to reply.
In March 1967 the House Committee on Un-American Activities issued
a report on a protest scheduled for April known as Vietnam Week, the
theme of which was: "The real objective of Vietnam Week is not the
expression of honest dissent to promote the best interest of the
American people and their Government, but to do injury and damage
to the United States and to give aid and comfort to its enemies." 9
Other forms of harassment have included widespread police interference with the right of assembly and repeated incidents of police
brutality, as well as police photographing of persons participating in
peaceful antiwar marches, vigils and other demonstrations. Attempts
by draft boards to accelerate the induction of antiwar demonstrators
have also occurred.95 Summarizing the situation in June 1967, the
American Civil Liberties Union said:
[T]o applaud the fact that dissent has not been muted,
despite the rising emotionalism of the Vietnam War, is not
to say we may relax the civil libertarians' vigil. There are
signs, ominous signs, that a storm is brewing.

.

.

.

The

random collection of incidents attached to this statement
illustrate[s] the steadily accelerating strains on unpopular expression. .

.

.

Such instances show that dissent

is now the object of official and private intimidation and
harassment. Unless these, and others, are vigorously and
courageously opposed, unless the right and importance of
dissent are re-affirmed and defended, the nation could slip
9
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, at 1, col. 6; Hearings on H.R. 271 Before
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
95

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMIMISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, THE
ANTI-VIETNAM AGITATION AND THE TEACH-IN MovzEENT: THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION AND EXPLOITATION, S. Doc. No. 72, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 45

(1965).

961d. at xv.
97HOUSE

COMM.

ON

UN-AMERICAN

AcTIvITIEs,

COMMUNIST

ORIGIN

AND

MANIPULATION OF VIErNAM WEEK (APRIL 8-15, 1967), H.R. Doc. No. 186, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
98

See text
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back into a new era of McCarthyism with its dangers to a
free society-fear, conformity and sterility.'
There is no effective legal remedy for much of this activity.
Statements of public officials or warnings of investigation, for instance,
Nor is it possible to obtain court
are not subject to judicial redress.'
committees, apart from citations
of
legislative
activities
review of most
for contempt, or of many aspects of the loyalty-security program. In
other situations the issues can be brought to the courts, as in the case
of legislative contempts or draft board reclassifications, but only at a
stage in the proceedings when much damage has already been done
and when failure to prevail in court results in a criminal conviction.
In still other situations, such as interference with the right of assembly,
judicial relief is theoretically possible, but often cumbersome, timeconsuming, or ineffective.
It is not possible to deal here with the complex issues involved in
this largely unexplored field of law. All that can be done is to stress
two generalities and to recount briefly one significant development.
The first general point is that the judicial structure is not capable, by
itself, of fully protecting in practice the theoretical rights guaranteed
under our system of freedom of expression. Full realization of those
rights must depend ultimately upon attitudes ingrained in the public
mind and support extended by the body politic as a whole. The other
point is that, granting that certain deficiencies are inherent in the
judicial system, its performance could be greatly improved. One of the
major challenges before us is to develop those judicial techniques which
will enable our laws and legal institutions to ensure our system of
freedom of expression the highest degree of protection of which these
techniques are theoretically capable.
One significant step, which illustrates what must be done to
render judicial protection of wartime dissent more effective, has recently been taken. That step advances the techniques for securing
judicial review at an early enough stage to be useful. It concerns the
controls exercised by the draft boards over expression of dissent by
persons subject to registration under the Selective Service Act.
In 1965 statements were issued by various Selective Service
officials that students who engaged in anti-war protests would lose
99 American Civil Liberties Union, The Vietnam War and the Status of Dissent,
June 4, 1967. An accompanying memorandum listed numerous instances of harassment. See also an earlier statement of the A.C.L.U., Civil Liberties and Vietnam
Protests, Oct. 27, 1965; A.C.L.U. 46rH ANNUAL REPORT (JULY 1, 1965-JAN. 1, 1967)
at 30-31 (1967) ; McCarthyiwm Ten Years Later, THE PROGaRESSWE, June 1967, at 3.
100 But see Finman & Macaulay, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and
the Words of Public Officials, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 632, 677-723 (1966).

1008

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.116:975

their draft deferments and would be immediately inducted into military
service.'' The issue came to a head in October when a group of
students at the University of Michigan staged a sit-in at a local draft
board in Ann Arbor, for which they were convicted of trespass. The
Michigan Selective Service headquarters thereupon sent the names
of the students involved to their local draft boards, indicating that the
sit-in was a violation of the Selective Service Act and could subject
the participants to reclassification and immediate induction. Some of
the students were reclassified by their draft boards as I-A, subject to
immediate induction."" General Hershey, Director of the Selective
Service System, took the position that registrants should not lose
deferments or be penalized under the Selective Service Act for protest
against the war so long as their protest was "peaceful and legal," but
that registrants who engaged in sit-ins at draft boards, burned draft
cards, or otherwise interfered with the administration of the Selective
Service system in violation of the law should be subject to immediate
induction."0 3 His views were disputed by a group of 103 law professors
who argued that illegal acts protesting the war were punishable in the
ordinary way, but could not validly be a basis for the imposition of
sanctions by the draft boards.'
The Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Criminal Division agreed with the law professors.'0 5
The threat to freedom of expression posed by the actions of the
Selective Service officials is readily apparent. Certainly a draft board
may not constitutionally reclassify any registrant, or apply any other
sanction to him, simply because he chooses to exercise his constitutional
right to express opposition to the war. Nor may the draft board take
such action where the registrant engages in an illegal form of anti-war
protest. In such a situation the board is not attempting to punish
action; other, comparable illegal acts have not been punished by induction. Rather, the board is undertaking to punish the expression
element in the protest. Furthermore, apart from the constitutional
issues, the Selective Service Act itself does not authorize draft boards
to apply such sanctions' 0 6
101 See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Gen. Lewis B. Hershey,
Director of the Selective Service System, Nov. 5, 1965, reprinted in Civil Liberties and
Vietnam Protests, supra note 99.
102 Cohen, Punishment by Conscription: General Hershey's Big Stick, 201 THE
NAT Io 520, 520-21 (1965).
103 Letter from General Lewis B. Hershey, 202 THE NATIoN, Jan. 3, 1966 (unnumbered page preceding p. 1).
104 Yale Daily News, Jan. 6, 1966, at 2, col. 2.
05
' See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
0 6
'
See Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d' Cir. 1967), noted in
81 HAnv. L. REv. 685 (1968); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hlohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rv. 1033, 1045-46 (1968);
Note, Reclassification of the Sit-In Demonstrators,19 U. FLA. L. REv. 143 (1966).
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Yet the position of the registrant is a precarious one. General
Hershey has not withdrawn from his position, and while his view is
not binding on local draft boards, it is obviously persuasive if not
compelling. Even more important, however, is the fact that under
existing law the registrant cannot challenge his draft status in the
courts except by refusing to submit to induction and raising the issue
in the subsequent criminal prosecution.'
Nor can he always be sure
that some form of apparently legal demonstration will not end in
illegality. For a registrant, therefore, the exercise of first amendment
rights to protest the war becomes, as a practical matter, most hazardous.
The effect of this impasse on a system of freedom of expression
can never be completely redressed. But fortunately the courts have
been able to fashion a partial remedy. Two of the Michigan students,
who had been reclassified by their New York draft boards, brought
suit to compel the boards to restore their student deferments. 8 The
district court dismissed the complaint, following the rule that a draft
board classification may be challenged only in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.0 9 The court of appeals reversed, carving out an exception
to the usual rule where "the threat to First Amendment rights is of
such immediate and irreparable consequence not simply to these students
but to others as to require prompt action by the courts to avoid an
erosion of these precious constitutional rights." 110 This doctrine,
which has potential application in many other areas of first amendment
rights, represents an important advance in judicial protection of our
system of freedom of expression."'
Two years later General Hershey reiterated and expanded his
position. In a letter to local draft boards on October 26, 1967, he
declared:
[D]eferments are given only when they serve the national
interest. It is obvious that any action that violates the military selective service act or the regulations, or the related
processes cannot be in the national interest.
It follows that those who violate them should be denied
deferment in the national interest. It also follows that illegal
activity which interferes with recruiting or causes refusal of
10 7 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) ; Falbo v. United States, 320

U.S. 549 (1944).
108 Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
109 See id. at 823.
1l Id. at 820.
1 1
3 The technique is one that was employed by the Supreme Court, in connection
with harassment under state sedition laws, in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965). But cf. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967) ; Cameron v.

Johnson, 88 S. Ct. 1335 (1968).
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duty in the military [or] naval forces could not by any
stretch of the imagination be construed as being in support
of the national interest."2
General Hershey's letter was directed against registrants who were
turning in their draft cards as well as those registrants who were
demonstrating more generally in opposition to the draft. Local draft
boards throughout the country began reclassifying registrants in accordance with General Hershey's recommendation and a series of cases,
similar to the Wolff case, have been brought to challenge such actions." 3
But the impact on the right to oppose the war extends beyond the
particular individuals affected, and in order to reach the broader
problem a class suit has been instituted in the District of Columbia
seeking to force the Selective Service System to abandon the whole
policy.' 4 Whether the development begun in the Wolff case will be
brought to an effective culmination depends upon the outcome of
these cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

Our experience over the years in attempting to provide legal support for an effective system of freedom of expression in wartime would
seem to point to several basic conclusions. Neither the clear and
present danger test, nor the incitement test, nor the balancing test,
affords an adequate measure of protection under the first amendment.
Only the rule of full protection for expression, as distinct from action,
establishes a clear-cut, functional doctrine that can withstand the pressures of wartime. The major problem, therefore, is to define the
terms, and refine the concepts, of "expression" and "action." This
112 N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1967, at 2, col. 4. See also Martin, The Draft as Pun.ishment: Trial by Hershey, 204 THE NATION 139 (1968).
113 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1967, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1968, at 3,
col. 3. One of these cases, in which a divinity student classified IV-D was reclassified
I-A after turning in his draft card, is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit having affirmed the dismissal of the case by the District
Court for the District of Wyoming. Oestereich v. Local Bd. No. 11, - F.2d - (10th
Cir. Feb. 20, 1968), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3443 (May 20, 1968) (No. 1246).
Following the Wolff decision the Selective Service Act was amended to make
explicit the rule that judicial review of draft board classification was obtainable only
as a defense to a criminal prosecution for refusal to accept induction. Pub. L. No.
90-40, § 8, 81 Stat. 104 (1967), amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3). The constitutional questions, however, still remain.
The suit is being brought by the
114 N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1967, at 2, col. 7.
National Student Association, the Students for a Democratic Society, and 15 presidents
of university student councils. National Student Association, Inc. v. Hershey, Civ.
No. 3078-67 (D.D.C., March 7, 1968). The suit was dismissed by the District Court
on the ground that the Hershey letter of October 26 was only a recommendation, not
a directive, and hence not reviewable. The case has been appealed.
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process is essential for any satisfactory application of the first amendment. For conduct amounting to expression must be free of restrictions, and conduct amounting to action cannot be governed by the
principles appropriate to expression. Beyond this the crucial task is
to improve the techniques for making the theoretical protection of the
first amendment realizable in practice. The full protection theory of
the first amendment is viable in wartime, but it needs further support
to survive as a reality.

